Official Cursor company post dated November 13, 2026, “An update on our recent security incident,” with schema datePublished and dateModified 2026-11-13T12:00:00.000Z (about 20:00 HKT Friday 13 November; the same noon-UTC stamp appears on other Cursor posts, so treat the clock as date-only precision). After two weeks of investigation, Cursor says the October incident “started at Fireworks”: an attacker obtained “an access key we had issued to Fireworks. The key was exposed by Fireworks, and the attacker used it to copy data from a read-only storage bucket we used to share data with them.” That bucket held “limited coding agent traces, mostly from 2025, from sessions not in Privacy Mode,” and “a small number of those traces contained credentials that had not been redacted; less than 0.01% of customers had API credentials exposed.” From those credentials the attacker reached “select SaaS tools used by Cursor” and accessed archived non-production source-code repositories (some with business contact information), limited customer-support data and email, product usage metrics and contact details, “summaries of some coding agent conversations,” and “some credentials users had sent to the Cursor support team.” Coding-agent traces were exposed for “fewer than 0.05% of users,” each of whom Cursor says it has notified. On October 29, “using a stolen credential from the exposed data from our internal system, the attacker placed malicious, unauthorized copies of Anthropic's Claude Code extension directly on the cache used to serve the Cursor VS Code extension marketplace.” Cursor states: “Anthropic did not publish this copy, and this was not a vulnerability in Anthropic's product. The marketplace source, Open VSX, never had the malware.” First-party impact lock, new versus the October 31 card: “At most 5,000 users who requested specific cached versions of the extension on October 29 potentially received the malicious build. It was available for approximately 11 hours before we removed it.” Affected versions remain Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313. Cursor says last observed attacker activity was November 1 and was blocked; it has moved all inference off Fireworks, rotated exposed and precautionary credentials, rebuilt the marketplace, and redeployed production infrastructure. Privacy Mode prompts and code, production infrastructure, official app releases, other marketplace extensions, customer code repositories, and “Cloud Agents for customer teams, Grok Bot, and all other SpaceX SI products” were not affected, per Cursor. Uninstalling the extension alone “may not be enough.” Soft-title: Cursor’s investigation update tying a Fireworks-exposed Cursor-issued key to customer traces and credentials and to the already-disclosed marketplace backdoor — not a new October 29 incident, not a recard of the October 31 takedown card, and not a recard of the already-LIVE Wednesday Fireworks October update. BleepingComputer (Lawrence Abrams) published an independent write-through November 14, 2026, 12:27 p.m. ET, about 01:27 HKT Sunday 15 November, after Saturday’s close. The first-party post itself was dated Friday and was missed at Saturday’s close. Do not import BleepingComputer’s “SSH backdoors” or “up to 5,000 developers to malware” wording as a confirmed-infection count; the official figure is a potential-exposure ceiling.
First-party investigation now locks the Fireworks-key origin, customer-trace and credential impact rates, and the “at most 5,000 users” marketplace figure that the October 31 card had to omit as secondary-only.
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Cursor published “An update on our recent security incident” dated November 13, 2026. The schema datePublished and dateModified are both 2026-11-13T12:00:00.000Z, about 20:00 HKT Friday 13 November, but other Cursor posts use the same noon-UTC stamp, so the clock should be treated as date-only. The post was dated Friday, after Friday’s LIVE close and before Saturday’s, and was missed at Saturday’s close. BleepingComputer’s independent write-through carries datePublished 2026-11-14T12:27:25-05:00, about 01:27 HKT Sunday. Cursor now says the October incident “started at Fireworks.” An attacker obtained “an access key we had issued to Fireworks. The key was exposed by Fireworks, and the attacker used it to copy data from a read-only storage bucket we used to share data with them.” That bucket held “limited coding agent traces, mostly from 2025, from sessions not in Privacy Mode.” “A small number of those traces contained credentials that had not been redacted; less than 0.01% of customers had API credentials exposed.” From those credentials the attacker reached select Cursor SaaS tools and then archived non-production source-code repositories, limited customer-support data and email, product usage metrics and contact details, summaries of some coding agent conversations, and some credentials users had sent to support. Coding-agent traces were exposed for “fewer than 0.05% of users,” each of whom Cursor says it has notified. On October 29, “using a stolen credential from the exposed data from our internal system, the attacker placed malicious, unauthorized copies of Anthropic's Claude Code extension directly on the cache used to serve the Cursor VS Code extension marketplace.” Cursor states that Anthropic did not publish the copy, that this was not a vulnerability in Anthropic’s product, and that Open VSX never had the malware. “At most 5,000 users who requested specific cached versions of the extension on October 29 potentially received the malicious build. It was available for approximately 11 hours before we removed it.” The versions remain Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313. Cursor says last observed attacker activity was November 1 and was blocked, and that Privacy Mode prompts and code, production systems, official app releases, other marketplace extensions, customer repositories, and “Cloud Agents for customer teams, Grok Bot, and all other SpaceX SI products” were not affected. Uninstalling the extension alone “may not be enough.”
- A first-party revision of the “at most 5,000” ceiling or of the trace and credential rates
- A Fireworks first-party account of how the Cursor-issued key was exposed
- Any confirmed-infection figure, or a further customer-notification update
Vendor-confirmed investigation update, not an independent audit. The 12:00 UTC timestamp is likely date-only. “At most 5,000” is a potential-exposure ceiling, not a confirmed-infection count. The Fireworks key-exposure claim is Cursor’s attribution. BleepingComputer’s malware/SSH wording is not used as a first-party fact.